Heidnik v. Horn by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-18-1997 
Heidnik v. Horn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"Heidnik v. Horn" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 85. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/85 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
 1 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
NO. 97-9000 
_____________ 
 
In re: Gary Heidnik 
 
MAXINE DAVIDSON WHITE, 
 
          APPELLANT 
 
v. 
 
MARTIN HORN, COMMISSIONER,  
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
GREGORY WHITE, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE STATE 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT PITTSBURGH AND; 
JOSEPH P. MAZURKIEWICZ, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE 
STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT ROCKVIEW AND; 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(E.D. PA Civ. No. 97-cv-02561) 
_____________________ 
 
Argued April 17, 1997 
Before:  BECKER, STAPLETON and COWEN,  
CIRCUIT JUDGES. 
 
(Filed April 18, 1997) 
 
 
 
     Billy H. Nolas, Esq. (Argued) 
     Robert Brett Dunham, Esq. 
     Center For Legal Education, Advocacy &  
     Defense Assistance 
     437 Chestnut Street, Suite 501 
     Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 
 
     Kathy Swedlow, Esq. 
     David Wycoff, Esq. 
     Defender Association of Philadelphia 
     Federal Court Division 
     437 Chestnut Street 
     Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
      Counsel for Appellant 
 
     Ronald Eisenberg, Esq. (Argued) 
  
 
 2 
     Catherine Marshall, Esq. 
     Donna K. Zucker, Esq. 
     Office of the District Attorney 
     1421 Arch Street 
     Philadelphia, PA 19102 
      
      Counsel for Appellees 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 This is an appeal from an order of the district court  
denying the motion of Maxine Davidson White and Betty Heidnik 
requesting a stay of the execution of Gary Heidnik, appointment 
of federal habeas corpus counsel on his behalf, and next friend 
standing.1  The motion was filed in the district court just over 
two days ago (April 15, 1997) and the order appealed from, which 
followed marathon hearings lasting until midnight, was entered 
the next day at 6:00 p.m.  We conducted extensive oral argument 
yesterday afternoon.  This hectic pace, which is a continuum of a 
similarly paced state court proceeding that commenced on April 
11, 1997 and was concluded in the trial court on April 15, 1997 
(the matter is presently pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court), is a function of the fact that the Governor of 
                     
     
1The motion was originally filed in the name of Gary 
Heidnik, but, appended to the moving papers was the affidavit of 
Maxine Davidson White, Heidnik’s daughter, who sought appointment 
therein as next friend.  After a careful review of the record, 
and pursuant to our authority under Fed. R. App. P. 43, we have 
substituted her as a party.  Betty Heidnik has also claimed next 
friend status, but because her relationship to Heidnik remains 
unclear (she appears to be his ex-wife), it would not appear at 
present that she qualifies. 
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Pennsylvania has issued a warrant for Heidnik’s execution in the 
Pennsylvania death chamber at the State Correctional Institution 
at Rockview, which expires on April 19, 1997.  For the reasons 
that follow, we vacate and remand with directions. 
 I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 These proceedings have their origin in a series of heinous 
crimes committed by Heidnik over a six month period in 1986-87.  
According to the record of his convictions, Heidnik kidnapped and 
tortured six women, murdering two of the victims by various forms 
of physical abuse and starvation.  In 1988, a jury convicted 
Heidnik of first degree murder and returned two sentences of 
death.  Heidnik personally petitioned the state courts to conduct 
no appellate review and to expedite his execution.  The state 
supreme court, however, engaged in statutorily mandated review of 
limited issues of state law and affirmed the judgment of 
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 587 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1987).   
 Heidnik made no further effort to challenge his sentence, 
but his execution was delayed by the decision of the former 
Governor not to issue warrants of execution.  The current 
Governor issued the presently outstanding warrant on March 20, 
1997.  On April 11, 1997, attorneys seeking to represent Heidnik 
filed a petition in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 
asserting that Heidnik was incompetent to be executed.  See Ford 
v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  The trial judge convened a 
hearing on Monday, April 14.  When called to the stand, Heidnik 
reaffirmed his previous position that he did not want to appeal 
his sentence.  Counsel elicited from him his belief in various 
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conspiracy theories, centering on his assertion that he was 
innocent of the murders and had been framed by the victims and 
corrupt police officers.   
 Heidnik’s delusional beliefs are illustrated by excerpts of 
his testimony before the state trial court.  Heidnik believes 
that the kidnapped victims carried out the two killings of which 
he was convicted: 
I think they killed Ms. Lindsay -- it’s possible that they killed 
her because she was a lesbian.  And I didn’t know that, and 
you know, up until that time. 
 
*** 
 
The reason I mentioned this was because they killed her the next 
day, they killed her the next day, which suggests that they 
either killed her because she was a lesbian or this gave the 
excuse they were looking for. 
 
*** 
 
Rivera was the brains behind it.  But Ms. Thomas I’m pretty sure 
did the actual killing. 
 
*** 
 
And do you understand I’m guilty of everything but murder?  I 
didn’t murder those two women.  Do you understand that? 
 
 
He also believes that the FBI can establish his innocence: 
 
[The FBI is needed so] I could prove I had not murdered these two 
women ... 
 
 In fact, he has constantly sought to contact the FBI in this 
regard for many years.  Additionally, because of his claimed 
innocence, Heidnik believes that the outrage caused by his 
execution will result in the end of capital punishment: 
I say real or phony, they can execute me, because I am innocent 
and I can prove it.  That is the end of capital punishment in 
this state.  When you execute an innocent man, knowingly 
execute an innocent man, you know there will be no more 
capital punishment in this state and possibly anywhere else 
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in this country.  And you know I didn’t kill them two women. 
 Go ahead and execute me.  That’s going to be the last time 
you ever execute anybody in this country.  That’s the end of 
capital punishment. 
 
*** 
 
Yes, I want you to execute an innocent man so there will be no 
more capital punishment .... 
 
*** 
 
I want to be executed because I want to be the last man in this 
country ever executes [sic], that’s the end of capital 
punishment ... You don’t do that shit, not in America.  And 
you’re not going to do it anymore because I’m ending capital 
punishment.  
  
 Petitioning counsel maintained that Heidnik’s protestations 
of innocence demonstrated that he must be delusional and that his 
willingness to be executed was a product of mental illness.  The 
court thereupon arranged for a psychiatric examination by a member 
of the court’s mental health unit, Dr. John O’Brien, a forensic 
psychiatrist.  The examination, which lasted some 90 minutes, took 
place in the presence of the stay petition attorneys and counsel 
for the Commonwealth.  Dr. O’Brien also reviewed court records, 
materials prepared by the Commonwealth, and affidavits prepared by 
the stay petition attorneys on the question of Heidnik’s 
competence. The hearing then reconvened for Dr. O’Brien’s 
testimony, which was to the effect that Heidnik understands that 
he is to be executed, and why, and that he is able to make his own 
decisions about his fate. 
 The judge credited O’Brien’s testimony, and denied Heidnik’s 
request for a stay.  An appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
is pending.  That court has stayed Heidnik’s execution, though it 
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has indicated that it will act upon the matter by noon on April 
18, 1997.   
 Dr. O’Brien was also the Commonwealth’s key (and only) 
witness at the proceedings in the district court.  The district 
court proceedings, however, addressed not the Ford v. Wainwright 
issue presently before the state supreme court, which inquires 
whether a defendant is capable of comprehending the reasons for 
the penalty and its implications, but rather the issue framed by 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), which asks whether the 
putative next friend has provided an adequate explanation why the 
real party in interest cannot appear on her own behalf to 
prosecute the action.2  The petitioners adduced the testimony of 
three psychiatrists, each of whom had examined Heidnik during his 
incarceration in the Pennsylvania prison system, Dr. Lawson 
Frederick Bernstein, Jr., Dr. Stewart Wellman, and Dr. Clancy 
McKenzie. 
 After consideration of the aforementioned testimony, the 
district court filed a memorandum and order in which it denied all 
requests for relief.  The court concluded that Ms. White had not 
met her burden of proof with regard to Heidnik’s incompetence.  It 
accordingly held that she did not have standing before the court 
and denied her next friend status.  We address the evidence 
adduced before the district court and its findings in the next 
section.   
                     
     
2There is no dispute that Ms. White meets the second 
qualification of Whitmore that the next friend must be truly 
dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he 
or she seeks to litigate. 
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 The court noted that stay petition attorneys also had 
presented an application under McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 
(1994), for appointment of habeas counsel, but in view of its 
denial of next friend status, the court did not reach the 
McFarland issue.  Taking cognizance of the principle of habeas 
corpus jurisprudence requiring the exhaustion of state remedies, 
but referencing the stipulation of the parties that the court 
could consider jurisdictional issues at any time, the court deemed 
there to be a waiver of any exhaustion requirement with respect to 
the issues before it.3  The court continued the temporary stay of 
execution until such time as this Court ruled on any appeal.   
 II.  THE DISTRICT COURT RECORD AND FINDINGS 
 The testimony of the three witnesses for petitioners was 
similar and consistent.  All three had seen Heidnik professionally 
on a number of occasions while he was incarcerated at the State 
Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, and Dr. Bernstein had 
treated Heidnik.  They agreed that Heidnik is a paranoid 
schizophrenic with a well-developed paranoid delusional system.  
In Bernstein’s view, Heidnik has a  
series of fixed false beliefs which are patently absurd and 
inconsistent with reality, which are all-encompassing 
in nature and which color every aspect of his cognitive 
functioning. 
 
Bernstein concluded that it was inconceivable that Heidnik could 
“rationally understand the nature of the proceedings.” (emphasis 
                     
     
3The district court also pointed out that the current habeas 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), provides that an application for 
a writ may be denied on the merits even in the absence of 
exhaustion.  Accord Granberry v. Greer, 107 S. Ct. 1671 (1987). 
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added).  This was because, in Bernstein’s view, Heidnik’s 
perception of reality was so completely flawed that he could not 
interact effectively with counsel.4  He further observed that 
there was no point of contact between Heidnik and the rational 
world. 
 Dr. Wellman, the chief psychologist of the State Correctional 
Institution at Pittsburgh, testified that Heidnik’s delusions are 
a function of his paranoid schizophrenia, and that the illness and 
its underlying delusional content renders him incompetent.  Dr. 
McKenzie, a psychiatrist who evaluated Heidnik at the time of the 
original trial proceedings, testified that Heidnik has been a 
paranoid schizophrenic since 1963, that he is unable rationally to 
appreciate the nature of the proceedings, and that he interprets 
everything according to his fixed delusional beliefs.5   
 All three psychiatrists appearing for petitioner agreed that 
the existence of delusions and a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia do not preclude rational conduct and competence.  
However, all three opined that such was not the case with Heidnik. 
 For example,  Dr. Wellman explained that, although in the 
                     
     
4Bernstein described Heidnik’s perceptions of reality as 
being that  
 
this entire event is a far reaching conspiracy in which he 
is the victim of the fact that the [victims] killed 
themselves and are now perpetrating a fraud against 
him, such that he will be executed for a crime that he 
did not commit. 
     
5Dr. McKenzie further testified that the sicker Heidnik 
becomes the more he wants to commit suicide.  Dr. McKenzie viewed 
Heidnik’s express desire to be executed as consistent with the 
desire for suicide.   
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abstract a person can be schizophrenic and competent, it is the 
content of a particular delusion that determines whether a 
delusion affects competency.  In Dr. Wellman’s view, the nature of 
Heidnik’s delusions renders him incompetent, “because he is seeing 
people as something other than what they are and is likely to 
interact with them based on an agenda dictated by his delusional 
belief.”  Drs. Bernstein and Mackenzie essentially agreed. 
 Dr. O’Brien, the sole witness for the Commonwealth, met with 
Heidnik on only one occasion -- the examination arranged by the 
state trial court.  Dr. O’Brien essentially testified that Heidnik 
was not a paranoid schizophrenic, that he was not delusional, that 
he was not mentally ill (at least at the time of his examination), 
and that he was not incompetent.  The central theme of Dr. 
O’Brien’s testimony was that what the petitioner viewed as 
Heidnik’s delusions -- primarily his belief that subsequent to his 
execution there would be a widespread recognition of his innocence 
and a consequent outcry against capital punishment and a process 
undertaken to abolish it -- was not a delusion but rather “an 
attempt on his part to recast what would otherwise be a rather 
tragic end to an individual into something of social value.”  He 
continued  
He maintains a belief in his innocence in the murders.  He 
admitted to being guilty of all of the other associated 
crimes and believed that he had reasonable and 
scientific data to support his belief that he was 
innocent.  And, as I indicated in my testimony 
yesterday, I see many criminal defendants a week and at 
least half of the post-trial defendants I see assert 
their innocence when I see them.  I am not a fact 
finder, I’m an opinion renderer, and I cannot second-
guess what the court has determined, the guilt or 
innocence to be, but it’s not at all uncommon for an 
individual who has been found guilty to represent to me 
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that they are in fact innocent.  I don’t regard that as 
delusional and I don’t regard it as delusional in Mr. 
Heidnik’s situation either. 
 
 The district court’s opinion turns heavily on [two passages 
from] Dr. O’Brien’s testimony.  They are as follows: 
He recurrently demonstrated an awareness of his current 
circumstances and based upon the 
representations he made to me and also the 
transcript of his testimony in the hearing 
yesterday, it is my opinion that he is 
clearly knowingly waiving his rights to 
appeal, in the sense that he knows that 
appeals are possible at this point in time 
and he is knowing that information and that 
he is facing death without the appeal, and he 
is knowingly terminating or declining to 
pursue further appeals.  I don’t think there 
is any dispute that he is intelligent in the 
sense that he has a great deal of innate 
intelligence.  And in my opinion it’s 
voluntary because I have not seen anything in 
the record or heard from Mr. Heidnik anything 
that would indicate that he is under duress 
of any sort, from external forces or internal 
forces, to give up his appeals. 
 
Only that the vast majority of schizophrenics are law-
abiding citizens who function from day to day 
and have clear, cognitive functioning.  And 
even if Mr. Heidnik does have paranoid 
schizophrenia, and I was seeing him during a 
moment in time when his symptoms were 
relatively quiescent, it doesn’t negate in 
any way my opinion that cognitively he’s 
intact, and he’s aware of his current 
situation and what he’s facing, and is able 
to make a decision regarding waiver of his 
further appeals. 
 
 Although the Commonwealth’s position rests heavily upon Dr. 
O’Brien’s testimony, the district court clearly rejected the 
central core of that testimony, for it found that Heidnik suffers 
from paranoid schizophrenia.  Although the district court did not 
say so in terms, it is also clear from its discussion that the 
district court found Heidnik to be delusional.  Indeed there is no 
  
 
 11 
evidence in the record, with the exception of Dr. O’Brien’s 
discredited testimony, that he was anything other than delusional. 
 The linchpin of the district court’s opinion, then, has to be its 
crediting of Dr. O’Brien’s testimony that even if Heidnik were 
paranoid schizophrenic, he is still able to make a decision 
regarding waiver of his further appeals.  It must be noted that 
Dr. O’Brien focused on Heidnik’s ability to recognize and process 
the factual circumstances attendant to that decision, but did not 
address whether the ultimate decision was itself rational.  
Accordingly, the district court made no findings about the 
rationality of Heidnik’s choices. 
 III.  DISCUSSION  
 The appeal before us is primarily that of a putative next 
friend seeking to establish that the death row inmate was unable 
to proceed on his own behalf.  Whitmore places the burden of proof 
on the putative next friend to establish by clear evidence the 
inability of the death row inmate to appear on his own behalf to 
prosecute the action.  Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021, 1026 (9th 
Cir. 1993).  That prerequisite is not satisfied when an 
evidentiary hearing demonstrates that “the defendant has given a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to 
proceed, and his access to court is otherwise unimpeded.”  
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 165.  Our review of the district court’s 
finding that petitioner did not meet this burden is for clear 
error.  See  In re: Zettlemoyer, 53 F.3d 24 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 To fully understand the Whitmore standard, we must examine 
two earlier Supreme Court cases.  In Rees v. Payton, 384 U.S. 312 
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(1966), the Court stated in the context of a party’s ability to 
waive his right to further appeals that: 
The court must determine whether [the petitioner] has 
the capacity to appreciate his position and 
make a rational choice with respect to 
continuing or abandoning further litigation 
or on the other hand whether he is suffering 
from a mental disease, disorder, or defect 
which may substantially affect his capacity 
in the premises. 
 
(emphasis added).  In terms highly relevant here, the Whitmore 
standard is further illuminated by the Court’s opinion in Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), in which the 
Court considered the standard for determining competency to stand 
trial.  There the Court stated that the “test [for competency] 
must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- 
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him.”  Id. at 402 (emphasis added).6 
 The district court’s conclusion that the petitioner had not 
clearly established that Heidnik lacked the capacity to make a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver with respect to 
continuing or abandoning habeas corpus proceedings turns upon its 
crediting of O’Brien’s testimony that Heidnik “is cognitively 
intact, aware of his current situation and what he is facing, and 
is able to make a decision regarding waiver of his further 
                     
     
6Although Whitmore was decided after Dusky and Rees, we do 
not read Whitmore’s reference to knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver to be divorced from the fundamental concept that 
underlies any notion of competency -- that of rationality.  See 
Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).  Lafferty is in 
accord with our distinction between factual and rational 
understanding.   
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appeals.”  But, given the district court’s finding that Heidnik is 
a delusional paranoid schizophrenic, that testimony is, as a 
matter of law, insufficient to support a finding of competence as 
understood in light of Rees and Dusky.  While there is no dispute 
as to Heidnik’s considerable intelligence and expressive powers, a 
factor that obviously influenced O’Brien, and it may be that the 
evidence would support a finding that Heidnik could make some or 
other decision regarding waiver of further appeals, there is no 
evidence, and no finding, that Heidnik could make a rational 
decision in that regard.   
 This is not a mere matter of semantics or of a witness or 
judge leaving out a key term because of the pressure of last 
minute proceedings.  Rather there is a fundamental flaw in the 
record as developed as is demonstrated by O’Brien’s proffer of 
what the Commonwealth suggested at argument was a rational 
explanation of Heidnik’s conduct -- the social value 
rationalization explanation we described in setting forth 
O’Brien’s testimony at p.9 supra.  That is because, as we have 
also explained, the district court rejected that testimony when it 
found that Heidnik was a delusional paranoid schizophrenic; a 
finding that is supported in the record and is not clearly 
erroneous.   
 The Commonwealth and the district court do have a fall-back 
position: Dr. O’Brien’s alternative testimony that Heidnik is 
competent even if he is delusional.  However, O’Brien offered no 
explanation as to the content of the delusion that would enable a 
determination whether the delusion affected Heidnik’s competency, 
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see supra p. 9, so as to explain why his conduct was rational.  
The Commonwealth seeks to fend this by pointing out that O’Brien 
testified that Heidnik had acted knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily, thus satisfying Whitmore.  But this testimony is not 
linked to any explanation of Heidnik’s conduct and does not 
address the critical distinction between factual and rational 
decision making. 
 In the final analysis the record reflects a situation in 
which a paranoid schizophrenic suffering from broad-based 
delusional perceptions has made a decision to die immediately 
rather than pursue available judicial remedies that conceivably 
might spare his life.  The only explanation he has advanced for 
having chosen immediate death is that after his death the public 
will become convinced that he was an innocent victim of a 
conspiracy and that the realization that he has been executed 
though innocent will end capital punishment once and for all.  
Petitioners’ three experts unanimously concluded that Heidnik’s 
death decision is based on his delusional perception of reality--
and has no rational basis.  Dr. O’Brien has simply failed to 
explain how Heidnik’s choice has a rational basis and is not based 
on his delusional perception.   
 In short, the record does not support a rational explanation 
as to why, even if Heidnik has rationalized to himself that he was 
innocent, he could, despite his delusions, make a rational 
decision to die.  A psychiatric expert might have supplied this, 
but O’Brien did not.  In the absence of any effective counter, the 
petitioner has met her Whitmore burden, and the order of the 
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district court must be vacated.7 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
 In view of the exigent procedural posture of the matter, 
created by the outstanding death warrant, we must be precise as to 
the terms of our judgment.  We will order as follows: 
 1. To the extent that a certificate of appealability is 
necessary, it is granted on the sole issue presented by this 
appeal. 
 2.  The order of the district court of April 16, 1997 is 
hereby vacated and the case remanded to the district court with 
directions forthwith to designate Maxine Davidson White as 
Heidnik’s next friend, and to appoint counsel for her. 
 3.  The district court is directed forthwith to enter an 
                     
     
7We note that in his concurring opinion in Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986), Justice Powell stated that 
once a defendant is found competent to stand trial, as Heidnik 
was, the state is entitled to presume that the defendant remains 
sane when the sentence is carried out.  See also Demosthenes v. 
Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735 (1990)(state court finding that defendant 
had given a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his 
right to review was entitled to a presumption of correctness 
under then 28 U.S.C §2254(d), now § 2254(e)).  We are aware that 
the state court recently rejected a Ford claim that petitioner is 
not competent to be executed.  In that proceeding, however, 
petitioner was not permitted to call a psychologist, Dr. Levitt, 
on the basis that he had not made a sufficient proffer even 
though counsel pointed out that Dr. Levitt had been present 
during Dr. O'Brien's examination.  Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 
4/14/97 Tr. p. 134-141.  Another of petitioner's proposed 
witnesses, Dr. Bernstein, who was available by telephone, was not 
called for reasons that are not entirely clear.  At all events, 
the findings by the state court are currently under review by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Under these circumstances, the 
presumption would not appear to be operative.  Moreover, as our 
discussion of the evidence presented in the district court 
demonstrates, the petitioner has rebutted this presumption here 
by clear and convincing evidence as required by 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(e)(1).   
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order continuing its stay of execution, pending action upon the 
McFarland petition which has been filed with the district court.  
While we are aware of no factors that might give rise to an 
exception to the normal presumption in favor of appointing counsel 
and granting a stay under McFarland, the record on this point is 
not developed and the Commonwealth may wish to be heard.   
                  _________________________ 
